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Abstract
Every year, donor countries pour billions of dollars of foreign aid into developing recipient
countries. Humanitarian and “win-win” rhetoric generally accompanies the grant, hospital,
school, or sports stadium. To a realist international relations scholar, it is highly unlikely that
powerful nations like the United States and China donate anything without political or
economic strategic interests in mind. How do American and Chinese strategic interests affect
the quality of development aid? This paper seeks to answer this question in the context of
Cameroon, a Central African state rich in resources and young minds but whose growth is
hampered by its colonial past and its stagnant political environment. This study also seeks to
understand what Cameroonians, the intended targets of foreign assistance, think of these
donors’ development projects. Based on interviews with government officials and citizens in
Yaoundé, Cameroonians are frustrated with the United States’ lack of infrastructural projects
and the transformative effect its political interests have on Cameroonian culture.
Cameroonians appreciate the visibility of Chinese infrastructural projects but are wary of
what economic or political power China might wield over Cameroon in the future. If
development aid continues this way, it will be difficult for Cameroon to reach its potential.

Résumé
Chaque année, les grandes puissances font des dons de milliards de dollars aux pays en voie
de développement. La rhétorique humanitaire et « gagnant-gagnant » accompagne
généralement les subventions, les hôpitaux, les écoles, ou les stades. Pour une étudiante des
relations internationales, il est improbable que les grandes puissances comme les Etats-Unis
ou la Chine fassent un don sans considérer des intérêts politiques ou économiques. Quels sont
les effets de ces intérêts stratégiques américains et chinois sur la qualité de l’aide
internationale ? Cette dissertation tente de répondre à cette question dans le contexte du
Cameroun, un état de l’Afrique centrale plein de ressources et de jeunesse mais qui a une
histoire de colonisation et un environnement politique stagnant. En outre, cette dissertation
cherche à comprendre ce que les Camerounais, la cible de l’aide internationale, pensent des
projets développementaux. Selon des entretiens avec des officiels et des citoyens de
Yaoundé, les Camerounais sont frustrés parce que les Etats-Unis ne font pas les dons en
l’infrastructure et parce que ses intérêts politiques transforment la culture camerounaise. Les
Camerounais apprécient la visibilité des projets infrastructurels de la Chine, mais ils se
méfient du pouvoir économique ou politique que la Chine pourra exercer sur le Cameroun
dans l’avenir. Si l’aide développementale continue ainsi, il sera difficile pour le Cameroun
d’atteindre son potentiel.
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INTRODUCTION
When politicians say “international development,” “foreign assistance,” or “bilateral
aid,” what comes to mind? If you are in the Central African state of Cameroon, think dollar
signs. Think the Palais des Sports, Cameroon’s newest and flashiest sports arena generously
financed by the People’s Republic of China. Think a failed $1.2 million good governance
program financed by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).
Think airplane donations, military training, and dams. Think Hu Jintao, China’s president,
shaking hands with Paul Biya, Cameroon’s president, posing for pictures at the Palais des
Congrès, and congratulating each other on the “podium development” they have
accomplished. Finally, think of what Cameroon has to offer a donor country: natural
resources, stability, strategic location, and nearly 20 million consumers.
In Cameroon, bilateral development aid has become the lingua franca of foreign
policy. Two of Cameroon’s longtime partners are the People’s Republic of China and the
United States. Both send diplomats and foreign aid strategies to woo Cameroonian
government officials and to bargain for political, economic, and/or militaristic strategic
interests. Despite the billions of dollars the United States and China have spent, what changes
have Cameroonians seen? In 2012, the life expectancy hovers around 50 years, and the
unemployment rate is more than 20 percent.1 Even in Yaoundé, the capital, roads are in
disrepair, and some families still live without running water.
Obviously, countries do not engage in interstate relations solely for humanitarian
purposes. As one Cameroonian put it, “En relations internationales, il n’y a que les
intérêts.”2 However, this paper seeks to determine whether the desires of donor states distract
them from the needs of recipient citizens. What have these multimillion dollar development

1

“Cameroon,” CIA World Factbook, accessed November 30, 2012,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geo/cm.html.
2
“In international relations, there is nothing other than interests.” Interview with supermarket employee B,
November 26, 2012.
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efforts done for the sector of the population who could benefit most? Since it seems that
donor countries rarely receive feedback from aid beneficiaries, the goal of this project is to
analyze Chinese and American development strategies in Cameroon and Cameroonian
citizens’ perceptions of these donor countries.
Two questions guided the research: How do Chinese and American strategic interests
affect the quality of development aid in Cameroon? How do Cameroonians perceive these
countries’ projects and, by extension, the donor countries? Based on observations in
Cameroon and on scholarly literature, the hypotheses are as follows:
H1a: The political and economic strategic interests of the United States and China,
respectively, reduce the potential impact that these governments’ development
projects could have in Cameroon.
H0: Strategic interests have no effect on the quality of development projects
that the Chinese and American governments finance.
H2a: The more aware Cameroonian citizens are of Chinese and American
development projects, the more successful the projects have been.
H0: Cameroonian citizens’ awareness has no impact on the success of the
Chinese and American governments.
This project reflects data gathered over four weeks through observations and formal and
informal interviews with Cameroonian, American, and Chinese government officials and
Cameroonian citizens in Yaoundé, Cameroon.
Because development aid is a vast and often ambiguous subject, it is necessary to
define several key terms within the scope of the paper. First, development aid is a specific
type of foreign aid that, separate from disaster relief or security assistance, aims to improve
citizens’ standards of living.3 This paper defines development aid as bilateral aid, i.e.
assistance from a donor country’s government to a recipient country’s government, in the
form of grants, loans, technical assistance, and in-kind contributions. However, the research

3

Carol Adelman, “Foreign Aid: Effectively Advancing Security Interests,” Harvard International Review 29
no. 3 (2007): 62-67.
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was conducted in terms of development projects – the goods and services available to the
public – and did not consider the amount of money Cameroon receives from the United
States or China.
Secondly, strategic interests can be defined as what the donor country hopes to gain
by engaging in development aid. A country’s political interests ensure its national security by
securing allies, and its economic interests ensure national security by securing resources.
Finally, the success of development projects can be defined as an effective and transparent
use of development aid that has a positive impact on the sector of society that could benefit
most from foreign aid.
Although scholars have already written much about the United States’ and China’s
strategic interests in Africa, only Bjørn Nordtveit has written about China’s advances in
education development in Cameroon.4 An insufficient amount of information exists on
Cameroon’s development. This study fills a gap in the existing literature by comparing
American and Chinese interests and by asking the recipient population what they feel is
lacking from Cameroon’s development. Scholars discount the public’s voice too often in
favor of statistical analyses of growth. Additionally, the Cameroonian public does not
represent all of Africa, so its needs and wants must be considered within the country’s
cultural context.
The remainder of this paper is divided into six sections. The first section reviews the
history of US-Cameroonian and Sino-Cameroonian foreign relations and argues that the
existing literature on US and Chinese strategic interests is not specific enough to Cameroon.
The second section explains the project’s methodology. The third section presents the data,
and the fourth section describes the emergent themes. The fifth section responds to the
research questions and argues that US and Chinese strategic interests affect the quality of
4

Bjørn H. Nordtveit, “An emerging donor in education and development: A case study of China in Cameroon,”
International Journal of Educational Development 31 (2011): 99-108.
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development aid and Cameroonians’ perceptions of the donor countries in Cameroon. The
final section concludes and explores the implications of continued strategic-interests-asdevelopment-aid foreign policy.
FOREIGN RELATIONS AND STRATEGIC INTERESTS
A quick glance at the titles of recent works by two of today’s leading development aid
scholars reveals the divide between those who foresee end of poverty and those who think aid
is dead.5 Furthermore, scholars cannot decide whether recipient countries’ governments are
the problem or whether donor states meddling in others’ affairs is to blame.6 Regardless, both
the United States and China have long and entangled histories with Cameroon.
Cameroon is a Central African state with a population of nearly 20 million. It gained
independence from France on January 1st, 1960 and from Great Britain on October 1st, 1961
but maintains close ties with both countries. Outside of oil, its main exports are wood, cotton,
cocoa, coffee, rubber, and bananas.7 Cameroon is classified as a republic and has had a
multiparty political system since 1990. However, the current president, Paul Biya, has been in
power since 1982. It is a stable country that has never experienced a successful coup d’état or
civil war. These economic and political conditions make Cameroon an attractive foreign
relations partner.
The United States opened an embassy in Yaoundé, Cameroon on March 5, 1957, three
years before Cameroon became an independent state.8 One of the oldest development
cooperation agreements between the United States and Cameroon is the Peace Corps, which
opened its doors in 1962 in Cameroon. There are currently 212 volunteers serving in

5

Jeffrey Sachs, The End of Poverty (New York: Penguin Books, 2005); Dambisa Moyo, Dead Aid (New York:
Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2009).
6
David Burnside and Craig Dollar, “Aid, Policies, and Growth,” The American Economic Review 90 no. 4
(2000): 847-68; William Easterly, “How Did Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Become Heavily Indebted?
Reviewing Two Decades of Debt Relief,” World Development 30 no. 10 (2002): 1677-96.
7
“Le commerce extérieur au premier semestre,” National Institute of Statistics, accessed November 30, 2012.
8
Joe Ewang Nzume (Chief Director of American and Caribbean Affairs Department, MINREX), in discussion
with author, November 19, 2012.
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Cameroon.9 Peace Corps Cameroon encompasses five major program areas: education,
community health, environment, community economic development, and youth development.
The organization focuses on grassroots development that provides citizens with resources to
autonomously better their lives.
In Cameroon, five US governmental agencies work on foreign assistance, including
the Peace Corps, the Department of Defense (DoD), the Department of State (DoS), the
Center for Disease Control (CDC), and USAID.10 Because of Cameroon’s stability and
multiparty system, it is likely that the US government considers Cameroon an important
Central African partner in trade and the promotion of democracy. However, USAID closed
its office in Cameroon in 1994 after President Paul Biya allegedly rigged his reelection.11 It
reopened its doors in 2010 under the same president. Today, with no Foreign Service officers,
Cameroon is a limited presence USAID country, and the organization focuses solely on
HIV/AIDS prevention. It works with the at-risk population, with pharmaceutical services to
provide greater access to medications, with orphans of HIV/AIDS, and with the Global Fund,
a multilateral organization dedicated to fighting AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria. The
Department of State sponsors a Special Self-Help Fund and finances worthy local
development projects initiated by Cameroonians.
It is difficult to gather concrete information on all American efforts because the list of
US development projects in Cameroon is long and varied. Furthermore, the US government’s
aid delivery channels range from military missions to good governance programs. While it is
important to understand how and why donor countries allocate bilateral aid, it was beyond the
scope of this study to document all of the United States’ projects in Cameroon.

9

James Beighle, “US Peace Corps Director of Programming and Training” (lecture, SIT, Yaoundé, Cameroon,
October 17, 2012).
10
Aisatou Ngöng (Program Management Specialist, USAID), in discussion with author, November 26, 2012.
11
Ngöng (Program Management Specialist, USAID), in discussion with author, November 26, 2012.

5

The development strategies of the United States, and more generally the West, do not
have a good reputation in developing countries. The Structural Adjustment Plan (SAP) of the
1990s failed miserably by reducing public expenditures on healthcare and education and
further impoverishing many developing countries. Today, the United States follows the PostWashington Consensus (PWC) which, like the SAP, is a market-based strategy for
development. However, the PWC recognizes the recipient government’s role in healthcare
and education spending.12
Within the existing literature, no scholar has investigated exactly what the United
States wants from its relations with Cameroon. Many have written about US interests in
Africa in general, but each African state is different. Generally, it appears that the United
States has vested political and economic interests when conducting its foreign policy. In
2008, the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) was launched to address traditional
and human security issues, like transnational terrorism and good governance – clearly a
political interest. However, the United States also wants to edge out China’s growing interest
in African oil, an economic and political strategy.13 Two scholars criticize the U.S. African
Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) because its aid is tied to trade and military training
conditionalities, more economic and political interests.14
Finally, one paper argues that foreign aid allocations does indeed respond to political
interests, such as colonial histories with recipients, voting alliances, and democratization,
while only foreign direct investment responds to a recipient’s “economic openness.”15 One
paper goes as far as to say that the amount of politically and economically (versus

12

Bjørn H. Nordtveit, “Western and Chinese development discourses: Education, growth, and sustainability,”
International Journal of Educational Development 29 (2009): 158.
13
Christopher Isike, Ufo Okeke-Uzodike, and Lysias Gilbert, “The United States Africa Command: Enhancing
American security or fostering African development?” African Security Review 17 no. 1 (2008): 35.
14
Barry Sautman and Yan Hairong, “Friends and Interests: China’s Distinctive Links with Africa,” African
Studies Review 50 no. 3 (2007): 75–114.
15
Alberto Alesina and David Dollar, “Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?” Journal of Economic
Growth 5 no. 1 (2000): 34.
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altruistically) guided development efforts varies directly with the donor’s level of openmarket capitalism.16 When synthesized, it seems that the United States wants to secure both
political and economic interests in Africa. This project seeks to pinpoint US interests within
the context of Cameroon and hypothesizes that US interests are mainly political because the
United States, compared with France or China, is not one of Cameroon’s main trading
partners. In 2011, Cameroon was the United States’ 107th largest imports supplier and the
United States’ 128th largest export market.17
In 2011, the United States was Cameroon’s sixth largest imports partner compared to
the People’s Republic of China, which took the number one spot as Cameroon’s largest
partner.18 Cameroon established relations with China on March 26, 1971. The two countries
signed a trade agreement in 1972, and China started sending medical teams in 1975.19 In
1982, China enacted one of its trademark foreign policies, “mutual-benefit cooperation.”20
Today, China has become one of Cameroon’s preferential development, political, and
business partners. There is no one agency responsible for foreign aid, but a Department of
Foreign Aid in the Ministry of Commerce is the main coordinator.21
In Cameroon, the Chinese government is celebrated for its grandiose infrastructure
projects. Major Chinese development in the country took off in 1982 with the construction of
the Palais des Congrès. Other well known projects include the Lagdo Dam (1984), the GynoObstetrics and Pediatric Hospital in Yaoundé (2002), and the Palais des Sports (2009).

16

Peter Blunt, Mark Turner, and Jana Hertz, “The Meaning of Development Assistance,” Public Administration
and Development 31 (2011): 172-87.
17
“Cameroon,” Office of the United States Trade Representative, accessed December 10, 2012,
http://www.ustr.gov/countries-regions/africa/cameroon.
18
“Cameroon,” CIA World Factbook. However, in his email, Mr. Li reported that China was Cameroon’s third
largest trading partner only after Nigeria and France in 2011. These discrepancies contribute to the ambiguity of
China’s development aid allocation figures and foreign relations. Ziliang Li (Economic and Commercial
Bureau, Chinese Embassy), email correspondence, November 29, 2012.
19
Nordtveit, “An emerging donor,” 102.
20
“China and Cameroon,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC, accessed November 30, 2012, http://
www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/fzs/gjlb/2949/t16478.htm.
21
Liz Voeller, “Japanese and Chinese Development in Cameroon” (ISP, Students in International Training:
Cameroon, 2006), 14; Nordtveit, “An emerging donor,” 99.

7

Currently, the Chinese government is working with the Cameroonian government to
complete a deep-water port in Kribi, two stadiums in Limbe and Bafoussam, and another
gyno-obstetric and pediatric hospital in Douala.22
According to the Chinese Embassy in Yaoundé, during its 41 years of “flourishing”
cooperation, China has provided development aid “in the form of humanitarian assistance,
assistance without compensation, interest-free loan, low-interest loan, preferential buyer
credit and commercial lending.”23 The Chinese government also executes smaller
development projects, like constructing wells, improving the water supply, and donating antimalarial and school supplies.24 China’s focus on education in Cameroon has also been well
received. In 2007, the Chinese established a Confucius Institute at the International Relations
Institute of Cameroon (IRIC). In 2009, the government built three primary schools and
offered Cameroon the most scholarships for Cameroonian students to study in China.25
These examples show that China has donated much to Cameroon. However, it is
difficult to gather concrete data. Mr. Ziliang Li, an employee of the Economic and
Commercial Bureau of the Chinese Embassy, gave generic answers about China’s efforts in
Cameroon. He also directed me to the website of China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs to learn
more about Sino-Cameroonian relations. Last updated in 2011, the website contained
information about relations in 2010. China limits access to governmental information even
outside of its borders.
A leading development donor, China has earned a relatively positive reputation with
recipient country’s governments. In contrast to the Post-Washington Consensus, scholars say
China is following the Beijing Consensus. Officially, the Chinese government calls their
development strategy the Xiaokang Path, which focuses on the quality of life and “sufficient

22

“40eme Anniversaire des Relations Sino-camerounaises,” Chinese Embassy of Cameroon, 2011.
Li (Economic and Commercial Bureau, Chinese Embassy), email correspondence, November 17, 2012.
24
Li (Economic and Commercial Bureau, Chinese Embassy), email correspondence, November 17, 2012.
25
Nordtveit, “An emerging donor,” 102.

23
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prosperity, rather than limitless economic growth.”26 Compared to Western aid, China offers
three attractive conditions to developing countries: practicality of aid, win-win cooperation,
and non-interference.
Based on the existing literature and the Chinese government’s foreign policy rhetoric,
China’s interests in Africa appear mostly economic. China has found a new market for its
textile and other consumer goods exports and simultaneously receives oil and minerals.27 Its
commercial desires are no different from any Western country’s desires, but what sets China
apart is its lack of intervention in recipient countries’ political affairs.28 Furthermore, it
attaches no political conditions to its aid other than asking recipient countries not to engage in
relations with Taiwan.29 To the Chinese government, aid and economic development go hand
in hand as Chinese foreign assistance figures include supporting Chinese businesses in
Africa.30 In 2009, Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi said, “The focus of our diplomatic
work…should be to directly serve the economy.”31 However, with increased interest in the
Cameroon-Chad pipeline and a military plane donation to the Ministry of Defense in
November 2012, the Chinese government may desire more political influence in Cameroon.
China’s interests in Africa appear economic in nature for the time being, while the
United States has dominantly political interests. What Cameroonians think of these
development partners remains unclear. Bjørn Nordtveit cites examples of the varying views
of Cameroonian politicians towards China, but he does not ask the citizens, the people who
could benefit the most from international development aid. This paper will present a portion

26

Nordtveit, “Western and Chinese development discourse,” 160.
Isike et al., “The United States Africa Command.”
28
Giles Mohan and Marcus Power, “Africa, China and the ‘new’ economic geography of development,”
Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography 30 no. 1 (2009): 24–28.
29
Sautman and Hairong, “Friends and Interests,” 87.
30
Nordtveit, “An emerging donor,” 101.
31
“China’s diplomacy economy,” Xinhua (news.xinhuanet.com), March 7, 2009,
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-03/07/content_10961803.htm.
27
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of the opinions of the residents of Yaoundé, Cameroon towards Chinese and American
development.
METHODOLOGY
This project was completed over four weeks between November and December, 2012.
It was set in Yaoundé, Cameroon because American, Chinese, and Cameroonian
governmental organizations are based in the capital. The project aims to measure what the
target population, Cameroonian citizens, think of American and Chinese development
projects based on a sample population of residents of Yaoundé. Although Cameroon is a
culturally diverse state, based on personal observation, many Cameroonians in Yaoundé grew
up in other parts of the country. Therefore, the opinions of residents of Yaoundé adequately
represent the country as a whole. Additionally, Yaoundé is the country’s seat of institutions
and hosts a wide array of governmental resources.
In order to understand governmental strategic interests and Cameroonian perceptions,
I interviewed American, Chinese, and Cameroonian government institutions and two sectors
of the Cameroonian population, which I term the “formally educated” and the “informally
educated.” The formally educated are those Cameroonians who have studied at a higher
education institution. The informally educated are those Cameroonians who have not studied
at a higher education institution but who may or may not be self-informed. I decided to use
interviews to collect data because they allow more time for clarifying questions. Since the
goal was to understand Cameroonian perceptions, it was necessary to spend time with
interviewees so that they would divulge their opinions.
To establish rapport with governmental organizations, I visited or called each
organization several times so that the interviewees would be familiar with me. I also brought
a letter stating my personal goals to accompany the letter provided by the Academic Director.
To reach formally educated Cameroonians, I visited professors’ offices and explained my
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project. I also asked Cameroonian students for suggestions, and they gave me names of
professors willing to talk to students. With informally educated Cameroonians, I built up
relationships with the people I interacted with on a daily basis. I explained I was staying in
Yaoundé to study Chinese and American development projects. At the end of the
conversation, I asked if I could come back another day to ask them about their experiences.
This method gave interviewees time to reflect and decide if they would like to participate.
The research questions that guided the research were: How do Chinese and American
strategic interests affect the quality of development aid in Cameroon? How do Cameroonians
perceive these countries’ projects and, by extension, the donor countries? To collect data
from the four sample groups – the Cameroonian government, the Chinese and American
governments, formally educated Cameroonians, and informally educated Cameroonians, I
used four sets of interview questions (for the interview questions in full, see Appendix 1).
Interviews with the Cameroonian government
I planned to interview the American and Caribbean Affairs Department and the Asian
Affairs Department of the Ministry of External Relations (MINREX). I completed a formal
interview only with the American Affairs Department, but the Asian Affairs Department gave
me a booklet on Sino-Cameroonian relations between 1971 and 2011. However, it was
produced by the Chinese Embassy. For Cameroonian government officials, I had 13
questions. The first seven were designed to learn more about how the Chinese and American
governments work with the Cameroonian government on development projects. The next five
were designed to determine what the Cameroonian government thinks are China’s and the
United States’ strategic interests. The last question asked about Cameroon’s needs so that the
answers could be compared to the answers of the Chinese and American governments.
Interviews with the Chinese and American governments
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I planned to interview officials from the Chinese and American embassies. When I
called the Chinese Embassy, I was directed to Mr. Ziliang Li who works in the Economic and
Commercial Bureau. Because he wanted to answer my questions by email, I tailored the
questions. I asked about the relations between China and Cameroon, what kind of
development projects China finances, how China knows what Cameroon needs, and who
executes the development projects.
At the US Embassy, I interviewed the sole representative of USAID. Eight questions
directed this interview. I asked about the kinds of projects USAID implements, what other
development work the US government does, how USAID measures effectiveness, its
relationship with the Cameroonian government, and whether it considers Cameroon’s needs
before determining development projects. I also interviewed the Peace Corps. I gathered
information on their development goals, which are apolitical.
Interviews with formally educated Cameroonians
I completed interviews with professors, students, and SIT advisors. Seven questions
guided these interviews. The main goal was to determine whether these Cameroonians were
aware of Chinese and American development projects, what they considered Chinese and
American strategic interests, and how, if at all, these interests reduced the quality of
development projects. They answered most of the other questions within their responses.
Interviews with informally educated Cameroonians
With informally educated Cameroonians, I introduced my topic and then asked five
general questions about their experience with Chinese and American development projects. I
asked if they knew of any projects, how they had heard about them, if they had affected their
or their families’ lives, and about the needs of Cameroon.
After collecting all data, I separated the interviews into their respective groups. I read
through each one and coded it for themes that appeared in all interviews. I also noted what
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contradictions arose between interviewees’ responses and the existing literature. I grouped
the responses of similar questions and extracted the themes that emerged from the data.
Finally, I used these findings to answer my research questions and hypotheses.
To validate my findings, I cross-checked public documents against officials’ words,
checked what Chinese, American, and Cameroonian officials said about each other, checked
what these officials said against existing scholarly literature, checked governments’
interviews against public’s interviews, and checked the public’s interviews against each
other. To make my results as reliable as possible, I reviewed my research questions before
each interview and used the same interview questions as a base for each type of interview. I
had originally planned to interview government agencies first to gather as much background
research as possible and then to move onto formally and informally educated Cameroonians.
However, I was unable to schedule interviews with government agencies until later in the
project, so I educated myself on current American and Chinese development projects before
interviewing the population.
To avoid any ethical concerns, I announced the goal of my research before each
interview and asked if I could record the conversation. At the end, I asked if I could use the
interviewee’s name. All data is stored on my personal laptop, and the names of the
individuals who want to remain anonymous are not connected to their interview.
The greatest limiting factor of this project was time. At the beginning, I wanted to
focus mainly on US-Cameroonian and Sino-Cameroonian relations. However, I was met with
many time-consuming and bureaucratic demands by the Cameroonian government.
Furthermore, researching both American and Chinese projects in less than four weeks is a
huge undertaking. I believe I would have gathered more information if I had chosen to
investigate one country’s development efforts. Another limitation was the structure of the
interviews. Because everyone is involved in a different area of development, I had to tailor
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my interview questions for each respondent. While the questions attempt to measure the same
concept, not all interviewees received the same ones.
Despite these limitations, the project uncovered information about US-Cameroonian
and Sino-Cameroonian relations that might never have come to light otherwise. Furthermore,
the bureaucratic demands forced me to refocus the project more in terms of Cameroonian
citizens, who rarely have a voice in development research. Finally, each interview became a
conversation that allowed me to consider things that I would have overlooked with my much
narrower research questions.
DATA PRESENTATION
The following section presents the data collected from the four interview groups: the
Cameroonian government, the Chinese and American governments, formally educated
Cameroonians and informally educated Cameroonians. I used the same set of questions for
interviewees of the same group. However, based on the flow of the conversation, some
interviewees answered my questions before I had asked them, and some questions were not
relevant to the interviewee. Thus, the data represents answers to similar questions.
The Cameroonian Government
Within the Cameroonian government, Joseph Nzume, the head of the American
Affairs department at the Ministry of External Affairs, was the only official interviewed.
When asked what development was, Mr. Nzume did not give a concrete answer. Instead, he
did not think it was necessary to define development because “the same person who is
involved in development is the same person who is involved in democracy.”32 It is difficult to
say that governments execute an action solely for development purposes or solely for
strategic interests. As a follow-up question, when asked if American interests affect their
development efforts, Nzume alluded to the mismatch between what Americans think is useful
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for the Cameroonian public and what Cameroonians think. He used the example of political
awareness, which Americans deem important but which Cameroonians may view as a push to
support opposition parties and unseat President Biya. According to Nzume, the United States
works through innumerable channels within the Cameroonian government and opened its
embassy in Yaoundé three years before independence because of American missionaries
already in Cameroon and the United States’ desire to stop French exploitation.
Nzume continued by saying that today the United States’ goals are transformative in
nature and that Americans do not listen to Cameroonians’ needs. While other countries like
Brazil, France, and Nigeria participate in joint and mixed commissions with Cameroon, the
Americans “don’t have such a mechanism…America only tells you, ‘I want to give you this.’
And on the surface, it sounds as though he is really giving you. But when you study it well, in
fact, in giving you, he wants to transform you.”33 The American government will not give
Cameroon everything it wants. For example, the United States has criticized the state of
Cameroon’s prisons. To protect its image, the United States will not build prisons but instead
only train guards. Ultimately, Nzume conceded that all powers give to dominate, including
the Chinese and French. In its transformative nature, the American government insists on
political conditionalities. For example, after the American government promises to build a
road, they say, “For us to fix that road, you promised to change the political system.”34
Although the American government is more concerned with human dignity than the Chinese,
it does not recognize that Cameroon cannot evolve to attain the level of respect for human
rights at the rate that the United States demands.
The American Government
After this one-sided but informative interview with the American Affairs Bureau of
MINREX, I focused on my interviews with the American and Chinese governments. Within
33
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the US government, I interviewed Aisatou Ngöng, a Cameroonian who received her
undergraduate degree in the United States and who is the only USAID representative in
Cameroon. Ngöng explained that no mission directs USAID’s work in Cameroon. When
asked what development projects it carries out, she said that USAID currently works on
HIV/AIDS prevention with at-risk populations, pharmaceutical providers, orphans, and the
Global Fund. There used to be a good governance program, but it was cancelled after the
2012 parliamentary elections were postponed. Each branch of the US government in
Cameroon (the DoD, DoS, CDC, USAID, and Peace Corps) seems to work at one point or
another with all of Cameroon’s ministries. Ngöng listed the Ministry of Public Health, the
Ministry of Defense, and the Ministry of Social Affairs.
To evaluate their projects, USAID hires an external evaluation team if the project lasts
more than three years. According to Ngöng, in terms of its HIV/AIDS work, USAID has been
successful. They have reached 22,000 people through six community drop-in centers in
Yaoundé, Douala, Bertoua, Garoua, Bamenda, and Kribi. Although USAID constitutes only
part of US governmental development efforts, Ngöng said, “The United States is not doing
major infrastructure development.”35 Infrastructure is one of Cameroon’s main priorities, but
donors like the United States execute mainly qualitative, “touchy-feely” development
projects. According to Ngöng, the United States understands Cameroon’s needs because it
initiates studies and negotiations and meets with civil society representatives. When asked if
US strategic interests affect development projects, she said that USAID employees’ work is
limited to certain categories of development because of US government missions.
The second US development agency interview was with James Beighle, the Director
of Programming and Training (DPT) of Peace Corps Cameroon and a longtime resident of
the country. From the beginning, most of my interview questions were not relevant because
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Beighle explained the Peace Corps is completely apolitical. Instead, Beighle commented on
the inherently political nature of the US Embassy. While the Embassy executes “get out the
vote” campaigns, the Peace Corps focuses on “education that is at the bottom level of all that
is really good and positive without being explicit about politics.”36 According to Beighle, the
Peace Corps was started to expose Americans to other cultures and because Americans
believe they can make a difference in the world. Specifically, the Peace Corps remains
apolitical to avoid suspicion and to continue to operate within countries that need volunteers.
When asked if this suspicion of the Peace Corps comes from its connection to the Embassy,
Beighle replied that it is likely because Americans are often viewed as “sowing seeds of
change and revolution.”37 For the most part, the Peace Corps and the US Embassy work well
together. However, Beighle said that the Peace Corps tries to distance itself from DoD
projects because the lines quickly become blurred within the communities where the Peace
Corps works to build trust. The DoD has good intentions, but the organization focuses on
macro-level projects and has not had as much development experience as the Peace Corps.
According to Beighle, Cameroonians in Yaoundé might not even be aware of Peace
Corps efforts because the organization is based in smaller towns which have traditionally
more need and more security. The Peace Corps works on a grassroots level and leaves it to
the DoD and to the US Embassy to change Cameroon’s government.
The Chinese Government
Compared to the Peace Corps, the Chinese government in Cameroon has taken a
completely different approach to development. I tailored my questions for Mr. Li, my contact
in the Economic and Commercial Bureau of the Chinese Embassy, because he preferred to
answer via email. Most of the questions received three or four sentence responses. According
to Li, Sino-Cameroonian foreign relations are flourishing with annual diplomatic exchanges.
36
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Chinese development projects are meant to improve the “livelihood and development
conditions for Cameroon.”38 The Chinese government determines what projects to finance
based on requests from Cameroon and works with a large number of ministries. Li asserted,
“China and Cameroon execute together the assistance projects in friendly consultations.”39
When asked how the Chinese government evaluates the effectiveness of development
projects, Li responded that China and Cameroon hold a mixed trade and economic committee
every three years to discuss the success of bilateral trade and economic cooperation and that
Cameroon participates in the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation. He also said that only
Cameroonians can say whether these projects have improved the quality of life. Relations
with Cameroon are win-win for both countries because Cameroon needs “capitals,
technologies, industrial products, and raw materials export market,” while China needs to
“import raw materials, export industrial products, and transfer capitals and manufacturing
technologies.”40 The Economic and Commercial Bureau links trade and development by
fighting against poverty, encouraging economic growth (although it was not clear whether
this was for Cameroonians or for Chinese), and facilitating the establishment of Chinese
businesses in Cameroon.
The publication the Asiatic Affairs bureau of MINREX gave me, entitled “40eme
Anniversaire des Relations Sino-camerounaises” and produced by the Chinese Embassy, also
provided insight into the Chinese government’s development strategy. In an interview with
Xue Jinwei, the Chinese ambassador to China, he emphasized the increased commercial
exchanges between the two countries. Furthermore, he added, “La coopération sinocamerounaise mutuellement avantageuse s’étend dans tous les domaines,” including
infrastructure, agriculture, energy, telecommunications, education, culture, health, sciences,

38

Ziliang Li (Economic and Commercial Bureau, Chinese Embassy), email correspondence, November 17,
2012.
39
Li (Economic and Commercial Bureau, Chinese Embassy), email correspondence, November 17, 2012.
40
Li (Economic and Commercial Bureau, Chinese Embassy), email correspondence, November 17, 2012.

18

technology, information, and youth.41 The three political principals that China has applied to
Cameroon are equality, mutual benefits, and practicality of aid “destinée aux secteurs liés au
bien-être du peuple camerounais…”42 In the 42 page document, 20 pages were dedicated to
Chinese accomplishments in Cameroon, including the construction of the Palais des Sports,
partnering with Camwater to complete a water supply project in Douala, the construction of a
deep-water port in Kribi, and six highways projects currently underway.
Formally Educated Cameroonians
I completed six interviews with formally educated Cameroonians. The interviewees
were: Professor Jean-Emmanuel Pondi, a political science and international relations
professor at IRIC; Professor Armand Leka, a sociology professor at the University of
Yaoundé I; Mr. Moussa Njoya, a political analyst with the Institut pour la Gouvernance en
Afrique Centrale; an anonymous professor and an anonymous student at L’école des postes et
des communications; Claude Nzouer, a sociology student at the University of Yaoundé I; and
Mr. David Tiomajou, the Peace Corps Training Manager.
The first question asked, “What American and Chinese development projects can you
name?” The following table presents the responses.
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Table 1. Formally Educated Cameroonians’ Awareness of Development Projects
Professor Pondi
Professor Leka

Mr. Njoya
Anonymous
Mr. Nzouer

Mr. Tiomajou

American Projects
Peace Corps, Special Self-Help
Fund
“Les Américains, comme un sujet,
je ne me suis pas beaucoup
intéressé.”43
USAID, National Democratic
Institute, Freedom House
Small projects in villages
Roads, health centers, schools,
hospitals
Peace Corps

Chinese Projects
Dams, Palais des Congrès, Palais
des Sports
Deep-water ports, Palais des
Congrès, Palais des Sports
Ports, Palais des Sports, Palais des
Congrès, Lagdo Dam, roads
Grandiose projects
Lagdo Dam, Palais des Congrès,
deep-water port in Kribi, Palais des
Sports, dams
Palais des Congrès, schools

From the data, it appears that formally educated Cameroonians are aware of a wide range of
development projects. There was no common thread among American projects, but every
interviewee mentioned large Chinese infrastructural projects.
Pondi, Leka, and Nzouer answered the question, “Do these governments’
development projects target Cameroon’s poorest population?” The first two said development
projects are a tool of governments and only help an elite part of society. Nzouer said that
China funds development projects that align with the aspirations of Cameroon. All six
respondents alluded to the economic interests of China in Cameroon. They also responded
that although Chinese political interests are unclear today, it is likely that in the future China
will demand compensation for the loans and gifts it has afforded Cameroon. The Chinese
government flatters Cameroon today so that it can influence Cameroon tomorrow.
No general consensus emerged about American interests, although all responses
alluded to political interests. One interviewee mentioned the American desire for world
stability, one mentioned good governance, and two mentioned securing Cameroonian oil and
a military base of operations in Central Africa. Every interviewee mentioned the
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transformative nature of American interests. The US government executes development
projects to capture the hearts and minds of the recipient population. However, Pondi, who
studied at Johns-Hopkins University in the United States, recognized the normalcy of
strategic interests in foreign relations, including development work.
Another relevant question explored perceptions of the United States’ and China’s
awareness of Cameroonian needs. Njoya said the United States in particular does not
understand Africa because it has never had a presence here, and Tiomajou responded that
grand organizations engage only in “podium development,” or development projects that
raise the opinion of the government but only benefit an elite few. Nzouer initially said that
both governments ask Cameroon about its needs but later admitted that the United States only
executes projects of their own desire. Leka said that governments understand needs if they
take the time to study the recipient culture, which does not happen often. Pondi asserted that
China understands Cameroon’s needs because it was in the same situation very recently.
Three interviewees were asked directly if strategic interests affect the quality of
development projects, but there was no consensus. Two respondents repeated their
perceptions of the United States’ and China’s strategies – that the United States tries to
influence the recipient government and culture and that China is interested in economic
resources. Leka said that in theory interests do not affect quality. However, interests influence
a donor government’s priorities, which are to apply its strategies of international marketing,
and do not always align with the recipient country’s or recipient population’s priorities.
Finally, the interviewees were asked to describe Cameroon’s developmental needs in
order to cross-check their criticism or praise of the United States and China. Leka mentioned
that Cameroonians need prosperity and democracy, i.e. a good standard of living and a freer
political environment. Pondi said that Cameroon needs to strengthen its own base by
providing food, housing, and basic infrastructure, which will enable it to work with Africa as
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a whole. Njoya also mentioned infrastructure and technology. The anonymous professor
mentioned Cameroon’s business environment, which deters investors. Nzouer did not name
concrete things but said that Cameroonians need to direct their own development.
Informally Educated Cameroonians
I interviewed eight informally educated Cameroonians: Julius Munah, a taxi driver;
Faustin Happi, a young man who works for a travel agency; a tailor; two security guards who
answered together as they seemed more comfortable that way; a woman who works in the
informal sector; two local supermarket employees; and a teacher.
The first question recorded whether they were familiar with any American or Chinese
development projects. The following table summarizes their responses.
Table 2. Informally Educated Cameroonians’ Awareness of Development Projects
Mr. Munah

Mr. Happi

Tailor

Security guards
Informal sector
Supermarket
employee A
Supermarket
employee B
Teacher

American Projects
Special Self-Help Fund, jobs for
security guards, US lottery system
for visas

Chinese Projects
Palais des Sports, roads, sponsor
orphans, health clinics in
Yaoundé, Limbe, Bafoussam,
Bamenda, and Buea
Scholarships to study in the US, Fabrication of vehicles, schools,
lottery system for visas, American factory
cultural schools
Buildings,
employ
gardeners, Dam at Lom Pagnar, new CNPS
chauffeurs, guards, schools, Peace building in Yaoundé, Palais des
Corps
Congrès
Peace Corps (but unsure how it Roads, schools, hospitals
works)
None
None
Work with the poorest sectors
Well-publicized projects
AGOA, democracy consultations

None

Infrastructure, agriculture, Lom
Pagnar dam, sell Chinese cars,
donate airplanes
None

Like the formally educated Cameroonians, the informally educated Cameroonians named
large, infrastructural Chinese projects. Only the tailor mentioned by name any of the
American developmental organizations; the security guards mentioned the Peace Corps after
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being prompted and admitted that they were unfamiliar with how it works. The woman in the
informal sector attributed her unawareness any projects to the fact that she works from 6am
to 10pm and has no time to watch television which is how most people she knows receive
their information. The security guards attested that they receive information from television
and from newspapers. The two supermarket employees also have access to newspapers at
work. Finally, the tailor has a television in her house.
No American or Chinese development project had personally affected any
interviewees or their families. Each person had a slightly different perspective of the Chinese
and American governments. It was difficult to separate opinions of the Chinese government
from Chinese immigrants. The tailor lambasted the Chinese government and said that it
purposefully hides its technology and that China has not built any schools in Cameroon.
Furthermore, with regards to infrastructural projects like the Palais des Congrès, she said, “Ce
n’est pas un don qu’ils font – ce n’est pas gratuit.”44 She, supermarket employee A, and
Happi do not believe the Americans execute a lot of efforts on the ground in Cameroon. Both
supermarket employees were suspicious of the Chinese government’s efforts, whereas the
security guards thought that China is in Cameroon to aid Cameroonians.
When asked about Cameroon’s developmental needs, two respondents said first and
foremost that the government has to change. No one can find any work because government
officials only give jobs to their families. The security guards said that Cameroon needs water,
schools, and roads. The tailor said, “Nous avons besoin de soutien et pas seulement
d’argent,”45 and thought Cameroonians needed help finding opportunities.
Each interviewee contributed a different perspective to the research. At the same time,
many of their frustrations were the same and can be grouped into broader generalizations
about American and Chinese development efforts and perceptions in Cameroon.
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45

“It’s not a donation they give – it’s not free.” Interview with tailor, November 19, 2012.
“We need support and not only money.” Interview with tailor, November 19, 2012.

23

EMERGING THEMES
Several pertinent themes emerged from the data and can be grouped by research
question and furthermore by country, the United States or China.
The United States: Giving “Tablecloths without Tables”
The first group is the effect of American strategic interests on Cameroonian
development. After analyzing the responses from Cameroonians and from government
organizations, three themes pertinent to this research appeared: the American government
either does not understand or does not respond to Cameroon’s needs, its political rhetoric is
contradictory, and it does not execute infrastructural projects as development aid in
Cameroon.
First, the Cameroonians interviewed agreed that the American government,
specifically the US Embassy, donates to Cameroon without asking what Cameroon wants.
The head of the American Affairs Bureau said, “If I give you a table cover when you don’t
have a table, it is wrong. Give the needy what the needy needs…The Americans don’t ask you
what you want. We have tablecloths without tables.”46 Professor Leka supported this
argument by describing foreign organizations that construct shower houses with individual
stalls without first studying the culture. In reality, no one in the village will use these shower
houses because showering is communal in certain cultures.47
Even the representatives of the Peace Corps, which reports to the Embassy, were
skeptical of what its partners – the DoS, DoD, CDC, and USAID – do. Tiomajou described
the Peace Corps as the “humanitarian face of America. USAID is the ugly face, the
gendarmes, the straitjacket.”48 Based on Cameroonians’ lack of knowledge of American
development projects or their disdain for these projects in Cameroon, it would appear that
America’s development is divorced from the needs of Cameroonians. Njoya, Tiomajou, and
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the tailor mentioned that Cameroon is hardly even on the United States’ radar and that France
is still largely in charge of Cameroon.
While the US Embassy received criticism, the Cameroonians interviewed had positive
feedback about the Peace Corps but recognized that its volunteers only work in small
villages. While their work is deep, it is not broad.49 It profoundly impacts the lives of
villagers, but it is not meant to transform Cameroon’s political or economic environment. In
fact, Peace Corps is completely apolitical by nature.50 This aspect may contribute to the Peace
Corps’s success, as the second emergent theme was the dubious nature of American politics.
Two interviewees mentioned America’s love for war, and, from personal observation, when
Cameroonians meet Americans they ask why Americans fight so many wars. America’s
democratic rhetoric does not match up with its actions in Cameroon. Ngöng of USAID and
Tiomajou mentioned the close of USAID after Cameroon’s 1992 elections. However, USAID
reopened under same president – what message does that send to Cameroonians about
America’s commitment to democracy? Furthermore, as the United States negotiated with
Paul Biya’s government, it is unclear who USAID serves, the administration or the citizens.
When compared to China, it appears that the United States is not giving Cameroon
what it wants. Every formally educated Cameroonian interviewed who mentioned the United
States said it works on the ground but at the grassroots level. The United States is not
involved in large-scale infrastructural projects. Ngöng confirmed this when she said that the
United States government engages in more “touchy-feely” projects.51 Based on the responses
from all groups, Cameroonians are interested in infrastructure whereas the American
government has its own strategy for improving Cameroonian lives. According to Beighle,
“[Americans] hate corruption, they hate dictatorships. That’s not where we come from, we
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don’t accept that.”52 The American government has its own idea of development which
relates to its desired international image. The American government has criticized the state of
Cameroon’s prisons but refuses to help build new ones.53 Perhaps its desire for a positive
international image dictates USAID’s involvement in HIV/AIDS prevention.
The Good, the Bad, and the Ambiguous: Perceptions of the United States
Although several distinct themes emerged about America’s development strategy, the
Cameroonian perceptions of the United States were more diverse. First, it is necessary to note
that personal experiences influenced Cameroonians’ perceptions of both donors. For
example, Pondi, a Johns-Hopkins University graduate, asserted that the United States has a
very good reputation in Cameroon. The tailor in Bastos said that she used to make clothes for
a former Peace Corps director, which helped feed her family. Second, whether an interviewee
had a positive or negative opinion of the United States, all interviewees acknowledged that
the United States does not publicize its efforts or is old news in Cameroon. Nzouer said,
“Effectivement, dans l’information concernant les États-Unis et la Chine, il y a une priorité.
Parce que depuis un dernier an, on a constaté, ce n’est plus les États-Unis.”54 In Cameroon,
American development is second fiddle to China’s efforts.
Five interviewees reported positive opinions of the United States vis-à-vis its
development efforts. Pondi, Nzouer, and Tiomajou mentioned that the United States’
governmental system is a role model for Cameroon. Cameroonians admire America’s
development history: how the country enjoys smooth transitions of power and a
representative democracy. In a newspaper article entitled “Obama peut contribuer à faire
supprimer la présidence à vie,” the author writes that Cameroonians are optimistic that the
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United States can pressure the Cameroonian government to change.55 The other interviewees,
while they also had criticisms, recognized that American officials attempt to integrate into
Cameroonian culture, especially when compared to Chinese officials, by employing
Cameroonian guards, gardeners, and chauffeurs.
On the other hand, one of the most unsettling criticisms of the United States was its
tendency to impose transformational conditions on the Cameroonian population. Three
interviewees specifically mentioned that the United States demands that Cameroon change its
political environment or its definition of human rights. Although many Americans accept
homosexuality, it does not fit into Cameroon’s culture. Forcing the government to jump
through hoops in order to receive development aid not only detracts from citizens’ needs but
also angers the recipient country. The anonymous professor asserted this is why America
experiences terrorist attacks.56
Overall, Cameroonians are unaware of the majority of US developmental efforts.
Some citizens recognize the most famous projects, but it is difficult for the people who could
benefit most from these development projects to access their services if they cannot even
access general news information. Furthermore, American efforts in Cameroon have the
potential to backfire against the American strategy of “winning the hearts and minds” of the
people.57
China: Friend or Foe?
When the interviews were analyzed, three major themes appeared about China’s
interests and its development projects: China donates visible infrastructural projects, its target
population and intentions are unclear, and it does not impose political conditionalities. Based
on the projects that interviewees named, the most obvious Chinese development has occurred
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in the realm of infrastructure – dams, buildings, and ports. According to Pondi, “[The
Chinese government] tend[s] to select projects that people can see right away, can feel right
away.”58 He compared this strategy to what Cameroonians are used to – the bureaucratic and
long-term strategies of European powers. With Chinese projects like the Palais des Sports, all
Cameroonians can benefit by watching the Lions, Cameroon’s soccer team. Even the security
guards, who were unable to name specific projects, said, “Ces projets sont pour la réalisation
dans notre pays.”59 The Chinese government’s projects have won over many Cameroonians.
Although the Cameroonian population may appreciate the Palais des Congrès, which
allows their heads of state to greet other country leaders in style, the benefits of this building
seem limited mostly to Cameroon’s elite. In November 2012, the Chinese government started
construction on a car factory in Kribi.60 While this might please the portion of the population
looking to purchase a car, I overheard one Cameroonian say, “La maman au Nord-Ouest n’a
pas besoin d’une voiture.”61 To this young woman, new cars are not the solution to
Cameroon’s development needs. In general, it is unclear what Cameroon’s most pressing
development needs are. The younger interviewees fear the country’s staggering
unemployment rate, while parents are concerned with staggering medical costs for their
families.
Those interviewed also think China’s intentions in Cameroon are unclear. Two
formally educated interviewees mentioned their fear of being indebted to China in the future,
and one mentioned that Cameroonians have not considered the consequences of receiving
gifts and loans from a rising power. While all interviewees agreed that China wants resources
to fuel its growth, several wondered what it really wants from Cameroon and if it can be
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trusted. In contrast, Cameroonians are aware that the American government hopes to install a
functional democracy in Cameroon.
Finally, the Chinese government does not attach political conditions to its
development aid. Those interviewed admitted it was a welcome change to the American
government’s strategy. However, two interviewees recognized that the Chinese government
is not concerned with human dignity.62 Therefore, it may send medical teams to Cameroon or
invite Cameroonian students to China, but it has no interest in changing Cameroon’s current
political environment. Cameroonians appear to appreciate China’s respect for their
sovereignty, but, based on personal observation, many Cameroonians feel the government
needs to change in order for their country to develop.
Winning Hearts and Pockets: Perceptions of China
Cameroonian interviewees can be separated into two camps: those who accept
Cameroon’s foreign relations with China and those who are suspicious. The four youngest
interviewees, Nzouer, Happi, and the security guards, had positive outlooks on Chinese
involvement in Cameroon. Nzouer asserted, “Quand les Chinois font le développement au
Cameroun, on leur dit ce qu’on veut. C’est ce qu’on appelle le développement participatif. Ils
participent avec nous à la réalisation du projet.”63 This younger generation also named largescale Chinese infrastructural projects, meant to be visible to the public. Perhaps these
donations have succeeded in wooing younger generations who think visible change is
necessary for Cameroon’s development.
On the other hand, Chinese development efforts have not completely seduced the
older generation. Despite the Chinese government’s non-interference policy and its
dedication to giving Cameroon the things the Cameroonian government asks for, its target
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population and intentions for the future are unclear. Munah reported good treatment at a
Chinese hospital in Limbe, but Tiomajou was skeptical about the number of Cameroonians
who can afford to visit Chinese hospitals. There was not enough time in this study to observe
who uses Chinese development projects. However, the author hypothesizes that
Cameroonians who benefit from the Chinese government’s large-scale infrastructure projects
are within the upper echelons of income and education because Cameroon’s poor have no
time or money to attend soccer games at the Palais des Sports.
All formally educated interviewees of the older population and both supermarket
employees mentioned the fear of being controlled by China in the future. These interviewees
have seen how other foreign governments have interacted with Cameroon. While China may
have adopted a different strategy with Cameroon, it has a long-term plan and does not divulge
its strategy to the rest of the world.64 A journalist expressed the same sentiment in an article
about China’s recent airplane donations. In La Nouvelle Expression, David Nouwou reported
that the Cameroonian government allotted 61 billion F CFA for the purchase of two Chinese
airplanes which should only cost six billion F CFA each.65 The relationship between
Cameroon and China is ambiguous, and the two countries may not have all citizens’ best
interests in mind.
Finally, several of the Cameroonian interviewees criticized the actions of Chinese
immigrants along with those of the government. For example, the tailor was most enraged
over the Chinese buying land and using pesticides on Cameroonian soil. The first
supermarket employee mentioned that Chinese immigrants do not make any efforts to
integrate into Cameroonian culture. While these comments do not reflect China’s
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development, Cameroonians’ perceptions of Chinese immigrants may affect how they accept
Chinese efforts in Cameroon.
ANSWERING THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS
From the data gathered, it appears that in Cameroon, bilateral aid is a tool of foreign
policy, a relationship defined by personal interests. In regards to the question of whether
American and Chinese strategic interests affect the quality of development aid, both powers
certainly have objectives in Cameroon that distract them from the population who could
benefit most from development aid. The United States and China operate with different
motives and through different strategies, but it is difficult to find Cameroonians who have
benefited directly from their development projects.
Because of its current hegemonic status, the United States is blind to the needs and
desires of developing countries. It has enjoyed prosperity and militaristic dominance for such
a long time that it cannot fathom any other way for countries like Cameroon to develop other
than to follow in the footsteps of US liberal democracy and liberal economics.66 Furthermore,
the United States is most interested in domestic security, which it has attempted to attain by
eradicating extremist groups or leaders from the rest of the world.67 Because US citizens
enjoy relative peace and prosperity, the United States does not realize when it steps on others’
toes, including in its developmental efforts in Cameroon.
China has adopted a different foreign relations policy. During its rapid economic
growth, China has maintained friendly partnerships with many other developing countries.
However, these relationships are almost purely government-to-government. In fact, no
Chinese nongovernmental organizations exist.68 The Chinese government has given the
Cameroonian government what it wants, but, from personal observation, it is obvious that the
Cameroonian government does not care or listen to what its people desire. Therefore, the
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Chinese government’s economic interests affect the quality of the development aid that
Cameroonians need.
Bilateral aid has failed as an effective development tool in Cameroon because it has
not reached the sectors of society who could benefit most from foreign aid. The United States
(with the exception of the Peace Corps) and China do not donate to Cameroon out of
humanitarian interests. However, it is impossible to say that development aid has done
nothing in Cameroon. The Lagdo Dam brings both electricity and hope to people looking for
changes to occur in their country, and USAID’s HIV/AIDS prevention programs have
reached over 22,000 Cameroonians.69
In relation to what Cameroonians think of foreign development projects and their
donors, Cameroonians’ opinions are divided. The United States’ political and cultural
influence in Cameroon is undeniable, and many view the United States as a good role model.
However, when compared to China, its efforts are not visible, which Cameroonians may
interpret as disinterest. Furthermore, the United States’ efforts to transform Cameroon into a
representative democracy have stirred anti-American sentiments in Cameroon’s traditional
and more conservative culture. In contrast, the Chinese government has given Cameroonians
many things from which many citizens can benefit, including dams, ports, and roads.
However, Cameroonians are beginning to realize that a true friend would also transfer the
necessary technology to be able to build roads by themselves.
While this project did not gather enough data to formally reject the first null
hypothesis, there is significant support for the first alternative hypothesis that the political and
economic strategic interests of the United States and China, respectively, reduce the potential
impact that these governments’ development projects could have in Cameroon. When USAID
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closed its doors in 1994, the Cameroonian government lost important US funding.70 The
United States’ commitment to democracy is admirable, but in trying to influence the
Cameroonian government, the United States turned its back on Cameroonian citizens unable
to unseat a corrupt president. The Peace Corps is the United States’ humanitarian form of
development aid, but their success comes from their apolitical nature. According to the
Cameroonians interviewed, China has strengthened its relationship with Cameroon for
economic resources. While China calls this a win-win strategy, it is unclear what Cameroon
will win in the future.
The second hypothesis stated that the more aware Cameroonian citizens are of
Chinese and American development projects, the more successful the projects have been.
There is not enough data to reject the null hypothesis because the interviewee’s awareness of
projects did not correlate with his access to these projects. For example, the tailor knew of
many development projects but said she was unable to leave her young son at home during
the day to find these projects. Additionally, the Peace Corps’s success in villages does not
reach people in Yaoundé, but it has existed without interruption in Cameroon since 1962.71
When analyzed in the context of existing literature, this research supports the concept
of US political interests in terms of democracy promotion, securing oil, and establishing a
Central African military base. However, the literature leaves out the success of the Peace
Corps’s apolitical strategy and the danger of transformative development strategies in
Cameroon.
This research also supports Chinese economic interests and its strong friendship with
other developing countries. The Chinese government has won the hearts and minds of many
recipient citizens by supporting the bank account of the Cameroonian government. It
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enhances its publicity by providing loans and, later, by relieving the debt.72 What scholars
have not yet studied is Cameroonians’ growing skepticism of Chinese aid.
CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS
As mentioned above, the goal of this research was to determine the effects of US and
Chinese strategic interests on the quality of development aid in Cameroon. The project sought
to include the necessary but often forgotten voices of Cameroonian citizens. After four weeks
of interviews with Cameroonian, American, and Chinese governmental organizations and
with formally and informally educated Cameroonians, this study argues that US and Chinese
bilateral aid does not deliver quality development projects to the sector of the population who
could benefit most. The United States and China use Cameroon for political and economic
interests, respectively. However, the United States’ saving grace is the Peace Corps, and
China’s infrastructural projects may provide indirect benefits to Cameroonians.
If foreign relations between Cameroon and the United States and China continue in
this fashion, there are implications for both the donor and recipient countries. It is undeniable
that Cameroon has appreciated China’s donations. At the same time, as Professor Leka
pointed out, when one person extends his hand to give a gift, the hand of the person who
receives the gift is always below that of the donor. China can continue to give to Cameroon,
but it cannot be considered a win-win situation if Cameroon never learns how to manufacture
its own cars or fix its own roads. China did not become an economic powerhouse because it
has goods but rather because it makes goods. In order to develop, several Cameroonians in
this study indicated the necessity of technology transfers.
The United States and China are not completely to blame for inefficient or
misdirected development aid. Cameroon’s government is also partly at fault because it is not
responsible to its constituents. Cameroonian government officials will never refuse airplane
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donations, sports stadiums, or HIV/AIDS prevention funding, especially if they involve a
banquet at the Hilton in downtown Yaoundé. It is possible that Cameroon will see growth in
the next few years thanks to the United States’ and China’s donations. However, it will be
difficult under Cameroon’s current corrupt administration where government officials only
give jobs to their family members.73
This study reports the Cameroonian perception of American and Chinese
development efforts in Cameroon. It relies on information from only a handful of government
officials and from many Cameroonians found in Bastos, a neighborhood not representative of
the city as a whole. Furthermore, four weeks is an insufficient amount of time to contact
governmental organizations and to conduct necessary follow-up interviews with all
interviewees. Regardless, this project presents the critical voice of a population often
overlooked.
In the future, other researchers could compile a more complete list of Chinese and
American development projects and visit each one. Observing and interviewing people who
use these projects would provide a better comprehension of Cameroonian perceptions.
Secondly, it would be useful to talk to more governmental organizations to understand the
process of bilateral aid transfers. Finally, other researchers could distribute surveys to obtain
quantitative data on Cameroonians’ awareness of American and Chinese development
projects. More country-specific research is needed to avoid giving tablecloths without tables
or feeding Cameroonians without teaching them how to fish.
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Appendix 1
Interview Questions
A. For the Cameroonian government:
1. Comment est-ce que le gouvernement américain/chinois définit le développement ?
2. Qui détermine les projets dont la population a besoin ?
3. Quels sont les types de projets développementaux est-ce que le gouvernement
chinois/américain finance ?
4. Qui exécute ces projets?
5. Qui est-ce qui soumet une demande pour l’aide développementale du gouvernement
chinois et du gouvernement américain ?
6. Qui reçoit les subventions ou les dons ?
7. Qui évalue la réussite de ces projets ?
8. Quelles sont les différences entre les projets du gouvernement chinois et celles du
gouvernement américain ?
9. Quelles sont les difficultés que vous rencontrez en travaillant avec chaque
gouvernement ?
10. Quels sont les buts stratégiques des Etats-Unis/de la Chine par rapport à leurs/ses
relations extérieures avec le Cameroun ?
a. Quelles sont les stipulations que ces gouvernements imposent quand ils
donnent l’aide développementale ?
11. Quand est-ce que les relations extérieures avec les Etats-Unis/avec la Chine ont
commencé ?
12. Comment est-ce que ces buts stratégiques affectent l’aide développementale ?
13. De quels types de projets développementaux est-ce que le Cameroun a besoin ?
B. For American/Chinese embassies/organizations:
1. Décrivez la définition du développement. (What is the definition of development?)
2. Le gouvernement américain/chinois finance quels types de projets
développementaux ? (What sorts of projects does the Chinese/US government
finance?)
3. Comment est-ce que le gouvernement décide de financer un projet ? (How does the
government decide to finance a project?)
4. Avec qui dans le gouvernement camerounais est-ce que vous travaillez? (Who do you
work with in the Cameroonian government?)
5. Qui exécute ces projets? (Who implements these projects?)
6. Comment est-ce que vous évaluez le succès ou l’efficacité de ces projets ? (How do
you measure the effectiveness of these projects?)
a. Quels sont les problèmes ? Les solutions? (What problems have you
encountered? Their solutions?)
7. Quel est l’impact de l’aide développementale pour le Cameroun? (What effect has
development aid had on Cameroon?)
8. Quel est l’importance stratégique d’avoir les relations extérieures avec le Cameroun ?
(What is the strategic importance of working with Cameroon?)
C. Formally educated Cameroonians:

1. Quels projets développementaux chinois ou américains est-ce que vous pouvez
identifier ?
2. Ces projets aident quelle partie de la société au Cameroun ?
a. Cette partie représente les gens avec les besoins les plus graves ?
3. A votre avis, avant que la Chine/les Etats-Unis fassent un don, ils connaissent bien les
besoins des Camerounais ?
4. Quels sont les buts stratégiques de la Chine/des Etats-Unis pour faire des dons au
Cameroun ?
a. Ils sont politiques ? Economiques ? Pourquoi est-ce qu’il y a une ambassade
américaine/chinoise au Cameroun ?
5. Comment est-ce que ces buts stratégiques affectent la qualité ou l’efficacité des
projets développementaux ?
6. Qu’est-ce que vous pensez des relations entre le Cameroun et les Etats-Unis/la
Chine ?
7. Quels sont les avantages de l’aide internationale pour les Camerounais ? L’aide
internationale est nécessaire pour le Cameroun ?
D. Informally educated Cameroonians:
1. Connaissez-vous des projets développementaux qui sont financés par le
gouvernement américain ou par le gouvernement chinois ? (Do you know of any
development projects financed by Chinese or American governments?)
2. Comment est-ce que vous avez entendu parler de ces projets ? (How did you hear of
them?)
3. Est-ce que vous utilisez ces projets? Ou est-ce que ces projets affectent votre vie ?
(Do you use them?)
4. Quel gouvernement finance les meilleurs projets ? (Which government finances better
development projects?)
5. Quels sont les besoins développementaux du Cameroun ? (What does Cameroon need
in terms of development?)

Appendix 2
Contacts
David Tiomajou, Training Manager. US Peace Corps Cameroon.
77.77.1286. dtiomajou@yahoo.com. French and English.
-------James Beighle, Director of Programming and Training. US Peace Corps Cameroon.
22.20.2534. JBeighle@peacecorps.gov. English.
Ziliang Li, Economic and Commercial Bureau advisor. Chinese Embassy.
22.20.6429. bernardlzl@hotmail.com. French and English.
Armand Leka, Sociology Professor. University of Yaoundé I.
74.48. 9997. armandleka@yahoo.fr. French.
Aisatou Ngöng, Program Management Specialist. United States Agency for International
Development.
22.20.1500. ext 4633. NgongA@state.gov. French and English.
Joe Ewang Nzume, Minister Plenipotentiary. Chief Director of the American and Caribbean
Affairs Department. Ministry of External Relations.
22.20.1557. nzumewang@yahoo.co.uk. English.
Jean-Emmanuel Pondi, Professor of Political Science and International Relations.
International Relations Institute of Cameroon.
22.23.1523. jepondi2009@yahoo.com. French and English.

